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ABSTRACT 
 
Today’s wireless communication systems having limited computational resources and 
communication bandwidth find certificate less public-key cryptosystems very attractive and 
vital to their operations in the sense that they help in reducing a significant amount of data 
load on the network. To eliminate the need of public key digital certificates Shamir proposed 
ID based cryptosystems in which the user’s identity (e.g. name or email id) is used as the 
public key. However this method had a major drawback of   the key escrow problem as a 
result of which certificate less digital signature (CDS) came into light. The main idea behind 
CDS is that there’s a private key generator (PKG) which generates a partial private key for 
the user .Then using that key and some of its own private information the user computes its 
actual private key. PKG’s public parameters and the user’s private key together calculate the 
user’s public key. Harn, Ren and Lin in 2008 proposed a CDS model which consisted of four 
generic modules namely PKG, user key generation, signature generation and verification. In 
this paper, we propose an improvement of the aforesaid CDS scheme in terms of time 
complexity and signature length and implement the new scheme in an e-cash model proposed 
by Popescu and Oros. Performance analysis of both the schemes has been carried out in 
details. 
. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: 
 Public key cryptosystems are one of the most essential parts of modern 
communication frameworks. Traditional public key cryptography requires each party which 
wants to send an encrypted message or a signed document should generate its own public 
key/private key pair. However the public of an entity needs to be authenticated by means of 
digital certificate which is provided by a recognized certification authority. However this 
method of attaching a certificate to authenticate a public key incurs unnecessary bandwidth 
and computation overhead for a wireless communication device that has a greater limitation 
in terms of computational power and speed of data transmission. In 1984 Shamir proposed a 
scheme where a party has to register at a private key generator (PKG) by providing its ID 
which can be a name or any unique combination of characters. Then the PKG provides a 
private key to the user or party and the ID of the user can be used as the corresponding public 
key. The user only needs to know the ID of his partner and the public key of the PKG to send 
an encrypted/signed document. But this system is not free from key escrow problem which 
makes the PKG itself as a potential threat of forging the signature or the attacking an 
encrypted document of one of its users. However a modification to this scheme was made by 
involving multiple PKGs in generating the user’s public key. Then self-certified public key 
system was proposed by Girault (1991) in which private key is generated by the user while 
the corresponding public key is calculated using the PKG’s and the user’s ID. However one 
still needs digital certificates for fully authenticating the partially authenticated public keys. 
Al-Riyami and Paterson in 2003 introduced the concept of certificate less digital signature. 
Their model involved a PKG module which is responsible for generating a partial private key 
for the user using its own master key. The user then from this private key and some of its own 
secret parameter calculates the actual private key. Public parameters of PKG and the private 
key of the user together calculate the user’s public key. This method completely removes the 
key escrow problem as the PKG is not aware of the actual private key of the user. Public keys 
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can be communicated to other users by publishing the same in a public directory or a website. 
In this way it is also not required to authenticate the public keys by issuing certificates. In 
2008 Harn, Ren, Lin [1] proposed a scheme which can convert any DL-based signature 
scheme into a CDS scheme. According to this scheme any user who wants to produce a 
signature uses four modules namely; Private Key Generator (PKG), User Key Generation, 
Signature Generation and Verification. 
 Information privacy is defined as “an individual’s claim to control the terms under 
which personal information that is information identifiable to the individual is acquired, 
disclosed and used”[2]. As technology advances sensitive personal information can be 
recorded, gathered, analyzed and misused by cyber criminals causing serious damage to 
customer interests. So it’s an important issue in today’s cyber era to provide information 
privacy and security to customers who constantly venture into the internet to perform their 
day to day activities. One of such areas which is most vulnerable to security attack is online 
transaction systems like e-cash systems used by e-commerce companies. In general three 
parties are involved in any online transaction; customer, merchant and bank. According to 
Brickell [3] and Stadler[4] a fair electronic cash system should prevent banks and merchants 
to obtain vital user information like credit card number, password, transaction history of the 
customers etc. In cases where there are suspected criminal activities the trusted third party 
with the help of the bank can revoke the anonymity of the customer or the coin. Popescu and 
Oros [5] proposed a fair offline e-cash system which implements coin tracing and owner 
tracing protocol. Trusted third party checks bank’s signature of e-coin and stores the tracing 
information. 
 In our paper we propose an improved version of the CDS scheme provided by Harn, 
Ren, Lin. Our scheme provides signatures of lesser length for input of any file size. Signature 
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generation and verification time are significantly minimized. Then we use this improved CDS 
scheme in the e-cash model proposed by [5]. 
 This thesis is divided into five chapters. The second chapter gives the fundamental 
idea behind the scheme. The third chapter briefly describes the existing scheme and our 
proposed scheme. The performance study gives in details the output of our scheme and the 
comparison with the previous scheme. Finally in the last chapter we describe how our scheme 
is implemented in e-cash system. In this paper we have used Popescu and Oros[5] framework 
for offline e-cash system 
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2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 Cryptography 
 Cryptography means information hiding from unauthenticated persons/programs. It is 
the application of modern techniques by which modern text (Plain text) is modified in to 
unintelligible text (cipher text). This technique is otherwise called Encryption. In past 
cryptography was being done by a common key (Symmetric Key Cryptography) but due to 
technological advancement now a days we use different key for the encryption process 
(Asymmetric Key Cryptography). These are described in the next section.  
1. Symmetric Key Cryptography 
2. Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
2.1.1 Symmetric key cryptography 
In symmetric key cryptography the sender sends the message by encrypting the 
message by a key say
1k . The receiver after receiving the cipher text decrypts the message by 
using the same key 1k . It’s assumed here that both the parties use a common key and the 
transmission of cipher text is done in an insecure channel. This system is flawed if the key 1k
is leaked i.e. if it’s known by the adversary. 
2.1.2 Asymmetric key cryptography 
It’s otherwise known as public key cryptosystem or public key encipherment, we have the 
same situation as of symmetric key cryptosystem, with a few exception. First, there are two 
keys instead of one, one public key and one private key. To send a secured message, the 
sender encrypts with receiver’s public key. To decrypt the message the receiver uses his own 
private key. 
 RSA Public Key Cryptosystem 
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 ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem 
2.2 Digital Signature 
A conventional signature is included in the document; it is part of the document. But 
when we sign a document digitally, we send the signature as a separate document. The sender 
sends two documents: the message and the signature. The recipient receives both the 
documents and verifies that the signature belongs to the sender. If it’s proven, then accepted 
else it is rejected. 
Several digital signature schemes have evolved during the last few decades. In this 
section, we discuss some of the widely used signature schemes. 
2.2.1 RSA Digital Signature Scheme 
In this scheme the signer, first uses an agreed-upon one way hash function to create 
the digest from the message, ( )D h M . Then he/she signs the digest, moddS D n . The 
message M and signature S are sent to the receiver. The verifier receives the message and 
signature. He/she first, uses the sender’s public exponent to obtain the digest, modeD S n  . 
He/she then applies the Hash algorithm to the message received from the sender to obtain   
( )D h M  and compares &D D . If they congruent then message is accepted else rejected.   
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Fig.2.1 RSA Digital signature scheme 
2.2.2 Elgamal Digital Signature Scheme 
The sender chooses a secret random number r . The sender generates a new random 
number each time he/she tries to sign a message. Then he/she calculates the signature 
1 1 mod
rS e p and 12 1( ) mod( 1)S M d S r p
     , where 1S and 2S  are the two signatures. 
The sender sends M, 
1S , 2S to the receiver. To verify the message, the verifier calculates  
Fig.2.2 ElGamal digital signature scheme 
 
1 1 mod
MV e p  and 1 22 2 1 mod
S S
V e S p  . If 1 2V V , the message is accepted else rejected. 
2.3 Cryptographic Hash Function 
A cryptographic hash function creates a fixed-size digest out of a variable-sized 
message. Creating such a function is best accomplished using iteration. Instead of using a 
hash function for variable sized inputs, a fixed-sized input is created and is used necessary 
number of times. This fixed-size input function is compression function. 
A set of cryptographic hash functions uses compression function from the scratch. 
Some of them are described in the following sections: 
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2.3.1 Message Digest (MD) 
Several hash algorithms are designed by Ron Rivest. These are referred as MD2, 
MD4 and MD5. The MD5 is the strengthened version of MD4 that divides the message into 
blocks of 512 bits and creates a 128-bit digest. As 128-bit is too small to resist collision 
attacks we go for what is called SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm). 
2.3.2 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 
The Secure Hash Algorithm is a standard that was developed by NIST and was 
published as a FIP standard. It’s mostly based on MD5. The standard was revised in 1995, 
which includes SHA-1. It’s then revised to four new versions: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 
and SHA-512. Characteristics of various SHA are shown in Table 1.1. 
 
 
Characteristics SHA-1 SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 
Maximum Message size 642 1  642 1  642 1  1282 1  1282 1  
Block Size 512 512 512 1024 1024 
Message Digest Size 160 224 256 384 512 
Number Of Rounds 80 64 64 80 80 
Word Size 32 32 32 64 64 
Table 1.1 Characteristics of secure hash algorithms 
2.4 Public Key Distribution 
In Asymmetric key cryptography, we assume that the public key of any user in the 
Internet is available to everyone so that they can send messages to each other. But the real 
problem lies on how to distribute the public keys. In order to distribute public keys we go for 
digital certificates. 
19 
 
2.4.1 Digital Certificates 
A certification authority (CA), a federal or state organization that binds a public key 
to an entity and issues a certificate. The CA has a well-known public key that cannot be 
forge. The CA checks the user’s identification and assigns a certificate for his/her public key. 
Any user wish to send the message can download the certificate and get the public key of the 
receiver. The ITU has designed X.509, a recommendation that has been accepted by the 
internet with some changes. X.509 is a way to describe a certificate in a structured way as 
shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2.3: X.509 Certificate  
 
2.5.Certificate less Signature 
Identity-based encryption seems to remove the need for a public key infrastructure, replacing 
it with the need for a key generation centre that computes a user's private key for them. This 
is more efficient, but has a significant disadvantage too. The fact that the trusted third party 
computes the private decryption keys for the users means that that trusted third party can read 
Version Number 
Serial Number 
Signature Algorithm ID 
Issuer Name 
Validity period 
Subject Name 
Subject Public Key 
Issuer Unique Identifier 
Subject Unique Identifier  
Extensions 
Signature 
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the messages of every user in the system. There are also significant practical problems 
associated with identity-based encryption, including the problem of handling key revocation.  
 
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a new type of encryption scheme that avoids the 
drawbacks of both traditional public-key encryption and identity-based encryption and in 
order to resolve the key escrow problem. The new scheme is named as certificate less public 
key encryption (CL-PKE) because their encryption scheme did not require a public key 
infrastructure. Certificate less cryptography achieves the best of two worlds. It inherits from 
identity-based techniques a solution to the certificate management problem in public-key 
encryption as it is an intermediate between IBC and PKC [Al- Riyami and Paterson 2003]. Its 
main purpose is to solve the key escrow problem inherited from IBC without the use of 
certificates as in the traditional PKC. In CL-PKC, a Key Generation Centre (KGC) is 
involved in issuing user partial private key computed from the master secret key. After that 
the user also generates an additional user private key and the corresponding user public key 
of its own. In certificate less cryptography key escrow is seen as an undesirable property, and 
user encryption and verification keys contain both a user identity and an unauthenticated 
public key. Similarly, user secret keys are constructed from two partial secrets: one coming 
from an identity-based trusted authority called the Key Generation Centre (KGC) and another 
one generated by the user. Certificate less security models capture scenarios where the 
attacker can be a system user or the KGC itself. To account for the fact that user public keys 
are not authenticated, attackers are allowed to replace users' public keys to attempt 
impersonation, a second paper by Al-Riyami and Paterson was published two years later. 
These authors show that a certificate less signature scheme may be constructed by composing 
a certificate less KEM with a standard DEM is secure in the Weak Type I and Weak Type II 
models in a manner similar to Cramer and Shou. Huang and Wong extended the concept of a 
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certificate less KEM to a certificate less Tag-KEM, mirroring the work of Abe et al. in the 
public key setting. The advantage of Tag-KEMs is that they can be combined with passively 
secure DEMs and still produce schemes which are fully secure against active attackers. After 
that the certificate less signature scheme is further improved by Baek et al. In this model, a 
public key can only be computed after a partial private key has been obtained. This slight 
change allows Baek, Safavi-Naini and Susilo to propose a certificate less signature scheme 
based on the CDH problem alone. The only slight drawback of this formulation is that it does 
not allow messages to be encrypted "into the future". Under the Al-Riyami and Paterson 
formulation, an entity without knowing the any partial private key can published a public key 
and therefore they may receive messages that they cannot decrypt until the KGC releases the 
partial private key to them. Then Liu et al. produced the original model for security against 
denial of decryption attacks and proposed a generic construction that combined a certificate 
less encryption .  
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CHAPTER 3 
PROPOSED CERTIFICATE LESS DIGITAL SIGNATURE  
AND E-CASH SYSTEM 
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3.1 Review of Existing Scheme 
In this scheme the PKG creates a partial private and public key pair, which is sent to 
the user and the user then calculates its own private and public key pair using DLP based 
algorithm. Thus the trusted PKG is unaware of the key pair that the user uses. Also it 
implements the IBS (Identity Based Signature) by using the user’s unique ID in producing its 
private and public key. As we are not using certificates, so in order to distribute the keys the 
public keys are placed in a public directory or transmitted along the digital signature. 
 
Fig. 3.1: Harn’s CDS Scheme 
 
The existing CDS scheme of Harn et al [1] contains four algorithms:  
1. PKG key generation 
2. User key generation,  
3. Message signing  
4. Signature verification 
3.1.1 PKG Key Generation: 
 Generate a large prime p  and a generator g  of 
*
pZ  
 Run the random oracle to select a random private key  x 
*
pZ  
And computes the public key modxy g p . 
 Return ( , , )params p g y  as the public parameters of PKG, 
While keeping x  as the master private key. 
24 
 
3.1.2 User key generation  
INPUT:           
OUTPUT: Public Key Pair       
 User selects a random private key 
*
1pv Z   with gcd( , 1) 1v p  , and computes 
mod .{ , }vu g p ID u  is sent to PKG. 
 PKG first selects a 
*
1pk Z   With gcd( , 1) 1k p   then computes mod
kt g p and 
modkr u p . 
 PKG solves the linear equation ( , ) mod( 1)h ID r xr kz p   
1( ( , ) )mod( 1)z k h ID r xr p   . The output  ( , )r R  is sent to User. 
 User computes                 and R          .   Is each User’s private 
key and ( , )r R  is each user’s public key.  
 
3.1.3 Message signing Sign  
INPUT:       , message m, private key   
OUTPUT: Signature σ 
 Chooses a random 
*
1pl Z  with gcd( , 1) 1l p   and computes 1 mod
lr r p . 
 1
1 1 1( ( , ) )mod( 1)s l h m r sr p
    
 Return 1 1( , , , )r R r s   as the complete CDS on m . 
3.1.4 Signature verification  
INPUT:        , m, σ 
OUTPUT: Accept/Reject 
 
1) ( , ) mod ,h ID r rg y R p and 
2) 1 1 1( , )
1 mod .
h m r r s
r R r p  
If both equations hold, then the CDS will be Accepted, otherwise the CDS will be rejected. 
3.2 THE PROPOSED CDS SCHEME 
The proposed scheme is having four phases for creating the signature and verifying it. Those 
are:  
1. PKG Key generation 
2. User key generation 
3. Signature generation  
4. Signature Verification. 
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3.2.1 PKG Key generation: 
 p  is a large prime and q  is a prime factor of 1p  . 
 g  is generator  belongs to   * of order q . 
 PKG chooses its private key       * 
 y =    mod p  is public key 
3.2.2 User Key generation: 
 User selects its private key       
  and computes his public key y₂=    mod 
p  
 User sends his ID  along with y₂ to PKG. 
 PKG selects k      
  and computes r =  mod p 
 s = ( )modAk r x p   and sends 
s  to user along with ID . 
3.2.3 Signature Generation: 
 After receiving s , user chooses l      
 and computes modlu g p  
 Then he computes 
1 1
( , mod )B B
x l s x
Bt H m u y p
     
 Certificate less Signature on message m is ( , )t s  . 
3.2.4 Signature Verification: 
o Any verifier obtaining signature   on message m can verify the authenticity 
by checking ( , mod )sBt H m y g p    
If t  and t  are equal then the CDS is accepted otherwise it is rejected 
 
3.3. E-Cash System: 
Electronic cash (e-cash) is a popular system since it realizes the digitalization of traditional 
cash system. This scheme enables customers to pay electronic money to merchants for 
different goods. There are some features that this system must implement, such as: 
 Anonymity: The merchant/the spender must remain anonymous. 
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 Unreusability: The digital cash/e-cash cannot be reused or copied i.e. to 
reduce the risk involved in forgery and to establish authentication. 
 Un-forgebility: Only the authentic users can produce the e-coin. 
 Off-line payment: Transaction can be offline, i.e. no communication with 
the bank involved. 
Electronic payment is one of the key issues of ecommerce development and many schemes 
has been propsed till date, but as far as the use of certificateless signature concerned to 
roboust the Electronic payment security aspect; a lot potential still to be exploited. .First 
Chaum suggested the electronic cash system in 1982.Subsequently, numerous untraceable 
electronic cash protocols were proposed based on these constructs (Chaum 1983, Fan and Lei 
1998, Ferguson 1994, Pointcheval and Stern 1997, Camenisch et al. 1995, Pointchval and 
Stern 1996)[7] . 
 
The framework proposed incorporates all these features and is described as follows. It has 
four parties or entities which are Customer, The Bank, Trusted Third Party (TTP) & 
Merchant. The communications among these entities is shown in fig. 5.1. All these parties 
maintain some parameters i.e. their private and public key. Here the TTP works as if it’s the 
PKG. It produces the partial private and public keys and using these keys the user produces 
its own key pair. Thus we avoid the key escrow problem that persisted in traditional schemes. 
Basically the e-cash system  
System parameters : 
 The system parameters consist of a large prime  , a large prime factor   of     and 
an element   ϵ   p  of order  . 
The Trusted Third Party 
The trusted third party executes the following to set up his parameters. 
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 Select random secret   t ϵ        
 Calculate  
t
              
 The public key of the trusted third party is  
t
   
 The corresponding secret key is  t  
The Bank 
The bank executes the following to set up his parameters. 
 Select random secret     ϵ    
 Calculate  
 
              
 The public key of the bank is  
 
  
 The corresponding secret key is    
The Customer  
The customer executes the next steps to set up his parameters. 
 Select random secret   u ϵ    
 Calculate  
u
              
 The public key of the customer is  
u
 
The Payment Protocol  
 The payment protocol involves the customer and the merchant in which the customer 
pays the electronic coin to the merchant. 
Withdrawal Protocol   
The customer contacts the Bank, requesting for a coin. The bank proves the customer’s 
identity and produces a coin represented by the tuple (              . 
Deposit Protocol  
 Involves the Merchant and the Bank as follows (the merchant deposits his electronic 
coins to the bank): 
 The merchant sends the e-cash (             ) to the bank. 
 The bank verifies the validity of the e-coin using the same operations as the merchant. 
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 The bank checks whether the coin has been double spent. If the coin was not 
deposited before the bank accepts the coin and will deposit the e-cash to the account 
of the customer. Then the merchant sends the goods to the customer. 
The Customer Tracing Protocol 
 It involves the Bank and the TTP. This protocol is used to determine the identity of 
the customer in a specific payment transaction. Money laundering can be prevented from 
detecting illegal customer in this protocol. 
 The bank sends the e-coin                 to the trusted third party. 
 The trusted third party verifies the validity of the e-coin using the same operations as 
the merchant and then sends    to the bank. Note that   is linked with the coin  . 
 The bank can find the corresponding customer from his database (saved in the 
withdrawal protocol). 
The Coin Tracing Protocol  
 The coin tracing protocol involves the bank and the trusted third party. This protocol 
determines the e-coin in the case when blackmailing occurs. The blackmailing can be 
prevented in this protocol 
 The customer sends his identity, ID, to the bank. 
 The bank sends   to the trusted third party. 
 The trusted third party finds the corresponding coin   and then sends the coin   to the 
bank. 
 The bank can reject the coin  . 
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CHAPTER 4 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
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4.1 PERFORMANCE STUDY 
It is clear from the following tables that our scheme has a lesser signature generation and 
verification time. The signature length is nearly same for different file sizes as we are using a 
hash function i.e. SHA 1 for the hashing. We have tested the Algorithm for various files and 
succeeded in generating and verifying the signature. Also the proposed scheme has less 
computational complexity as compared to the existing scheme. 
4.2 Comparison with Existing Scheme 
 
Operation Signature Generation Signature Verification 
Exponential        
Hash       
Multiplication         
Tab.4.1 Number of operations in proposed scheme 
Operation Proposed Scheme Harn’s Scheme 
Exponential         
Hash         
Multiplication         
Tab.4.2 Comparison with existing CDS 
    - Time taken for Exponential Operation         
   - Time taken for Multiplication operation       
    - Time taken for Hash operation 
 
Tab.4.3 Comparison of existing scheme and proposed scheme  
 
Operation Existing Scheme (Execution 
time) 
Proposed Scheme 
(Execution time) 
Signature Generation 44 milliseconds 21 milliseconds 
Signature Verification 20 milliseconds  5 milliseconds 
31 
 
 
 
Fig.4.1 Output of the Proposed Scheme 
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SECURITY ANALYSIS  
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Security Analysis 
We have done the security analysis for both our CDS scheme and the offline e-cash system 
which are described as follows. 
5. 1 Security Analysis of Proposed CDS Scheme 
In this section we will analyse the attacks based on CDS scheme and specify how our scheme 
is secured against them. Our scheme is entirely depend on the discrete logarithm problem 
(DLP) and discrete logarithmic assumption (DLA). 
DEFINITION 1: (DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM). Let   be a large prime and   a 
generator in   
  . Given        find the value   such that          . 
DEFINITION 2: (DISCRETE LOGARITHM ASSUMPTION). It is computationally infeasible to 
solve the discrete logarithmic problem i.e. it’s a NP-Hard problem. 
In our security analysis we consider two attacks, which are defined as follows: 
DEFINITION 3: (TYPE I ATTACK).In this type of attack the adversary   who knows the public 
keys, try to determine the master private key of private key generator (PKG). 
DEFINITION 4: (TYPE II ATTACK).In this attack the adversary    , who is a dishonest PKG 
knows the partial private key and public key tries to determine the user’s key in user key 
generation. 
THEOREM 1- The proposed scheme is secure against TYPE I attack 
PROOF- In TYPE I attack the adversary    knows the public keys of the PKG. Now in order 
to get the master private key  , adversary    has to solve the DLP, i.e.    
      , which 
is impossible as well as in feasible from the DLA. Hence our scheme is secured from TYPE I 
ATTACK. 
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THEOREM 2- Proposed scheme is also secured against TYPE II ATTACK 
PROOF- in TYPE II ATTACK adversary      is a dishonest PKG, who knows the public key 
and partial private key in user key generation phase, and tries to find the user’s private key. In 
proposed scheme user’s private key is   , which was generated randomly from   
 , and only 
can be known if the DLP can be solved for   . Hence it is secured against TYPE II ATTACK. 
5.2 Security Analysis of E-Cash System 
THEOREM 1- if the blinding scheme is secure against forgery then the e-coin is also un-
forgeable. 
Proof- If an adversary tries to forge an e-coin, he/she, must have to generate a valid blind 
signature of the Bank. Since DLA (Definition 2) says that DLP (Definition 1) is infeasible 
hence is our system un-forgeable. 
THEOREM 2- The anonymity of spender can be removed with the cooperation between the 
bank and TTP. 
Proof- In previously described e-cash system, we are always keeping records of the customer 
w.r.t the e-coin and is stored in linked to the customer with the bank and the TTP during the 
withdrawal protocol. Hence the bank can check the database and find the customer’s ID to 
remove the anonymity. 
The proposed scheme gives the facility to the user , as he/she can make anonymous payment 
with the merchant as the merchant cannot know the identification of a customer, he can only 
receive a coin from the user and verify the validity of the signature but cannot determine the 
customers identity . So the proposed scheme is withstand against Anonymity property. 
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FUTURE SCOPE & CONCLUSION 
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6.1. FUTURE SCOPE  
 Our scheme can be used in the traditional e-cash system for the signature generation 
and verification, which will decrease the communication bandwidth and the signing and 
verification time. Here in this section we are proposing the framework for the e-cash system 
and all the detailed parameters that all the entities/parties are going to use. This framework 
was proposed by Popescu and Oros [5]. We have slightly modified their scheme and 
introduced our scheme in it. 
6.2. CONCLUSION 
 
In this thesis, we proposed a new modified Certificate less digital signature (CDS) scheme 
with improved signing and verification times and complexity. We also incorporated the 
proposed scheme in the fair off-line electronic cash system with anonymity revoking trustee. 
We also employed the customer tracing and the coin tracing to achieve all the features of an 
ideal e-cash system. This scheme confirms authenticity of the digitally signed document, 
anonymity of the signer and non-repudiation of the signature generation process. This scheme 
can also be applicable to many real life scenarios, such as, e-banking, online auction and 
electronic voting system. 
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